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Jean Piaget and Eric Havelock are two writers who have essentially
identical conceptions of the nature and development of ideas and the
mind.

This essential identity is the case even though Piaget is studying

the cognitive development of the individual preoperational child, while
Havelock is studying the development of the Homeric Greek mind and ideas
in relation to the oral processes of communication which existed in
Homeric Greece.

Both the Homeric and the preoperational concentions of

the mind are examined in regard to the content and form of their ideas,
as well as to the mechanisms of their development.
Both conceptions of mind view this mental development as the
result of introducing new cultural information into the psyche.

This new

information conflicts with established structures and disrupts their equilibrium, eventually resulting in the development of a new more general
cognitive structure which is in equilibrium with the new information.
Each level of equilibrium has associated cognitive structures which
are qualitatively different from those in the preceding level.
The form and content of both the preoperational and the Homeric
conceptions of mind are shaped by the dominance of the perceptual faculties
at that level.

In both views, the mind is bound to perceptual concretes

and is incapable of abstractions.

mental processes, such as they are at

this level, are tied to actions, events, and mental imagery.

These

actions and events follow the structure of the nerceptual processes in
iv

that they are unidirectional and take place sequentially.

The minds

of the Homeric Greek and preoperational child are egocentric:

they

cannot take the viewpoint of another, and do not admit the existence of
evidence which conflicts with their own beliefs, since everything is
viewed from their particular perspective rather than from an "objective"
abstract one.
The few differences noted between Planet's conception of the preoperational mind and Havelock's characterization of the Homeric mind are
seen as a result of their varying perspectives, individual versus cultural,
and not as a result of any essential difference.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
An important part of man's approach to understanding himself is
his attempt to understand the origin and nature of his ideas.

Often-

times, his conceptions about ideas are grouped into one of two extremes:
either ideas are seen as the result of innate processes and hence are
rigidly determined, or they are considered to he determined by environmental happenstance.

Some contemporary writers concerned with the origin

and nature of ideas, however, view each of these two extremes as too
narrow to describe adequately the complexity and diversity of ideas.
To such writers, ideas exist in relation to both innate and environmental
conditions anH exhibit varying degrees of influence from each at different times.

Two of these writers are Jean Piaget and Eric Havelock.

Psychologist Jean Piaget has studied children extensively in order
to understand their processes of thought in particular, and the nature and
development of thought in general.

He has found that, as the child

matures, ideas develop through a series of stages.

Each stage is charac-

terized by a set of ideas which are qualitatively different from the
previous stage; that is, the child sees the world and himself in radically
different ways than he did before.

For example, at the age of six

or seven, the child passes from what Piaget terms the preonerational stage
to the concrete operations stage.

The child in the preoperational stage

is tied to his perceptions of the world with its consequent distortions
1
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and limitations--thus, the child's ideas about the world are colored by
this perceptual perspective.
operations, however, the

In the next stage, that of concrete
begins to lose his dependence on percep-

tion and begins to form abstract ideas.
Piaget sees each of these cognitive stages through which the child
passes as a necessary prerequisite for the stage which follows it.

The

conceptions of the earlier stages are never totally destroyed, but instead
are transformed and incorporated into the later stages.

According to

Piaget, the particular nature of the stages and the order in which they
occur are genetically determined--only the proper environmental conditions
are required in order to brinn about the progression from one stane to the
next.

The most important environmental parameter for the generation of

these various stages in the child is the cultural one.

If, for example,

the thought of the culture is "preabstract" in nature, then the necessary
environmental conditions which produce abstractions in the developinn
child are not present.

Therefore, the child will not develop the ability

to perform abstractions.
Eric Havelock, on the other hand, is concerned with the development
of philosophical thought in ancient Greece.

He has found that the mind

and its ideas are shaped basically by the mode of communication which is
prevalent in a society.

Thus, since the communication among the preliter-

ate Homeric Greeks was orally accomplished, their ideas were structured
by this technology of communication.

Havelock argues that, for the Homeric

Greeks, important or significant communication was contained in sagas
such as the Iliad and the Odyssey.
to assemblages of Greeks.

From memory, bards recited these sagas

However, not all types of information and ideas

are equally amenable to this oral process of communication; and if

information is not communicated to other rreeks, then it is not passed
on in the culture.

Thus in the sagas, there are stories of gods and

heroes acting in a great society.

This great society, then, serves as

an exemplar for the individual Greek who uses the actions of the gods
and heroes as a basis for his own actions.

Thus words and nhrases

which evoke concrete imagery are used in the saga, since these words and
phrases are easily transmitted from the speaker to the listener and, as
well, easily understood and remembered by the latter.

Abstract ideas

are not so readily amenable to this verbal process since they cannot
easily be put into these concrete formulations.
With the advent of literacy in ancient rreece, however, the Greek
mind began to be capable of abstractions.

Writing freed the mind from the

necessity of committing large amounts of information to memory.

Writing

also enabled the individual, in effect, to see the various parts of the
saga at one glance.

Self-contradictions and conflicts became more obvious

in the Iliad when it was written down than they were when it was orally
performed, since in the oral performance sections which contradicted each
other were not present to the consciousness at the same time.
phers, then, became able to classify and critique ideas.

Philoso-

Literate

communication therefore enabled the Greek mind to become abstract.

This

abstract mind is considered by Havelock to be qualitatively different
from its predecessor, the Homeric mind; that is, the two minds viewed
the world from radically different perspectives.
Parallels can be drawn between the various conceptions of the
formation of ideas as given by Piaget and Havelock.

The major parallel

is found in the conception of an originally concrete mind tied to perceptions, which is then transformed into a qualitatively different abstract
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mind.

Of special interest here is the specific parallel between Have-

lock's conception of the Homeric mind and Piaget's characterization
of the preoperational stage of mind.

This preabstract level of mind

is of special interest largely because adults in any culture often are
considered to be capable of thinking in abstract modes, yet the Homeric
Greeks seemed to have been "stuck" in a mode that, according to Piaget,
was "preabstract" and which would be found in any child as he is growing
up.

Especially intriguing is the related idea of the possibility that

cultures grow up in much the same way as individuals do.
The objective of this thesis is to assert the essential identity
of the two conceptions of mind--the Homeric mind and the preoperational
mind.

The character of these minds is the same, even though it is arrived

at by two authors using different routes.

This identity of character is

found both in the nature of the minds and in the mechanisms by which they
developed --necessitating an explication of both of these aspects in regard
to Piaget and Havelock.
The formulations, concerning the cognitive development of the individual and the nature of the poetic performance in Homeric Greece as
given by the two authors, generally will he accepted--since the direction
of this thesis is the exhibition of the two views as presented.
Invaluable to this discussion is the work of Hans Jonas on the
phenomenological characteristics of hearing and vision.

While his

phenomenological analysis of hearing will be examined, his analysis of
vision will not be presented in detail, since this paper is concerned with
the similarities between a mind which is determined by an auditory mode
of communication and the preoperational stage of cognitive development.
Therefore, the material presented on Jonas' analysis of hearing will be

5

used both to support and to expand the presentation of Havelock's
conceptions of the Homeric mind.
The order of the argument is as follows:

Chanter II presents

Jonas' phenomenological analysis of hearing, with an introduction to the
Homeric mind which provides a background for the more detailed study in
Chapters III and IV of how hearing works as a mode of communication for
the Homeric Greek.

Chapter V presents a detailed analysis of Piaget's

conception of the preoperational stage of cognitive development, as well
as his conceptions of the mechanisms of development of these stages.
Specific points of comparison between the Homeric and the preoperational
conception of minds also will be made in Chapter V.

Chapter VI, the con-

cluding chapter, summarizes the evidence of the preceeding chapters to
show the essential identity between the two conceptions of the mind pnd
its development.

CHAPTER II
HEARINn AND THE HMIERIC

mire

The object of this chapter is to provide both groundwork
and evidential support for Havelock's study of the Homeric mind.
The sense of hearing, its nature and limitations, as determined by
a phenomenological analysis, is of central importance for understanding
how important cultural information can be preserved in an oral culture.
A brief introduction to the general character of the Homeric mind will
be given so as to place Jonas' phenomenological analysis of hearing
in a suitable context.

Next, the characteristics of the sense of

hearing will be discussed in light of that phenomenological analysis.
Finally, the way by which information could be passed on in an oral
culture, given the phenomenal characteristics of hearing as analyzed
by Jonas, will be ascertained.

It should be noted that Jonas' analysis

of hearing is expanded for the purposes of this paper and that his own
primary purpose was only to help clarify the nature of vision by contrasting it with the sense of hearing.
To place this discussion of the phenomenal aspect of hearing
in a suitable context, it is useful to explain a distinction that Havelock makes--a distinction between two levels or types of communication
that exist in any culture.

First, there exists the ordinary-everyday

language in which common discourse is carried on.

Secondly, and more

importantly for the purposes of this thesis, is the area of preserved
6
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communication which, being more specialized and significant, is
reserved for formal purposes.

The second type of communication acts

much like a paradigm in that it sets limits on the range and nature of
thought in a society.1
In a literate culture, for example, literature and science
represent a portion of significant and hence preserved communication.
Important information for a particular culture is stored and easily
retrieved by the understanding and use of the formal languages of
such academic areas.

Likewise, in an oral culture,

permanent and preserved communication is represented in the saga
and its affiliates and only in them. These represent the maximum
degree of sophistication. Homer, Ao far from being 'special'
embodies the ruling state of mind.'
For members of a literate culture such as ours, it is difficult
to understand fully what life is like in an oral culture where all
transmission of important cultural information is dependent upon sneaking and hearing.

All information in an oral culture must exist in a

living context or else it dies, for there is no place for it to go to
be preserved unless it is carried in the active vehicle of individual
minds.

Information in an oral culture simoly cannot he nut in hooks

and cannot wait for someone to dust it off to help preserve the thounht.
Rather, an oral culture's thoughts cannot be abstract and sterile,
but have to be somewhat concrete in nature as well as of living relevance to the members of the culture.
Thus, for information to be transmitted in an oral culture, it
has to be spoken, heard and remembered.

Memory an

the spoken word,

'Eric A. Havelock, Preface To Plato (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963), n. 199.
2Ibid.,
p. 135.

which involve the shaping of both form and content of the message,
will be discussed in the following several chapters.

In the rest of

the present chapter however, the sense of hearing, which lies between
the spoken word and memory, and which conditions the nature of
both, will he discussed.

Jonas' phenomenological analysis of hearing

illustrates why, in an oral culture, it is difficult to remember a
large mass of material, and why the listener and the form and content
of the information have to be shaped in a way which facilitates memory.
It will

be helpful to begin with a brief analysis of what is

meant by the methodology of phenomenology, and with an explanation of
how it is used by Jonas.
Phenomenology, the methodology of Jonas, is not concerned, as
is much of philosophy, with questions of appearance (phenomena) versus
questions of reality (noumena), but instead is
a method which consists in describing phenomena, that is, anything
that is immediately given . . . its object is essence . . . , that
is, the ideal intelligible content of phenomena, which is seized
immediately in an act of vision--in the intuition of essence.'
A phenomenological analysis seeks to determine the structure of something as we perceive it, that is, it is not placed in some more general
context such as a particular philosophical system or in that of some
empirical science.

For example, to the physicist, sound is "a mechan-

ical disturbance propagated in matter by means of lonnitudinal waves
f compression and decompression. ,2

The physicist attempts to describe

sound in a way free from the subjective experience of the perceiver
1 1. M. Bochenski, Contemporary European Philosophy (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 19691,
pp. 129-130.
2
Otto Lowenstein, The Senses (Middlesex, Baltimore, and
Victoria: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 121.

(with the result that sound becomes easily quantifiable), while the
phenomenologist includes hearing as an important aspect of the
description of sound--since he wants to intuit the essence of that
experience.
In general, our sensory abilities provide us with a means of
communication with the world outside us.

Without our senses, we

would be totally cut off from communication with both nature and man.
According to Jonas, we see and touch objects as basic entities separate
from us.

Both the visual and tactile senses rely for their information

on the spatial quality of separation of objects--the extension of
space.

(This separation of the perceiver from the perceived raises

some fundamental epistemological questions of just how one can know the
"real" nature of what is perceived.

Jonas finds epistemological

agnosticism to result from the separating of the various senses from
one another.)
Hearing, however, is not a sense that can see or touch objects-it can only hear "sounds."

Hearing, then, in isolation from the other

senses, can refer only indirectly to external objects.

According to

Jonas, this indirect object reference characteristic of hearing is
due to the fact that hearing operates for its object reference in a
three step pattern.

First, we hear sounds; second, these sounds indi-

cate that something has occurred, i.e., there was some sort of action
that happened; third, there is an entity outside of us that caused the
action or occurrence.

Therefore, we realize that sounds represent

external entities to us, but that it takes more than just the sound itself, the first step, to "know" of an outside entity that has acted.
By itself [the sound) does not reveal anything beyond it, and that
there is an agent preceding and outlasting the acoustic act I know
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from information other than the acoustic one. The objectreference of sounds is not provided by the sounds as such, and
it transcends the performance of mere hearing. All indications
of existents, of enduring things beyond the sound-events themselves, are extraneous to their own nature.1
This very tenuous reference to external objects leads Jonas to
note that sounds can have their own "immanent 'objectivity.'"

Sounds,

then, can refer only to themselves and not to external objects so that
in music, for example, we can listen to the particular sounds and their
interrelationships, thus concentrating on the pattern of sounds rather
than looking for some existent thing outside of ourselves to which the
sounds refer.2
Information, to be both useful and meaningful to us, cannot
consist totally of discrete bits of data.

These bits must be arranged

in some kind of meaningful whole, i.e., information must he patterned.
Sound, however, comes to us in a temporal sequence--one sound follows
another and we have to combine those separate sounds in a way to give
a meaningful whole.

To achieve this synthesis, we must rely on memory.

Through /Memory] and certain anticipations, the whole sequence,
though at each movement only atomically realized in one of its
elements, i bound together into one comprehensive unity of
experience.'
Without memory, the sounds would occur and just as quickly pass away
and be of no use to us whatsoever.

Even so, sounds never stay around

for easy reference later on; in effect, they exist only as long as we
hear them, and they do not persist when we turn our attention elsewhere.
As Jonas says, "Extension of object and extension of its perception thus
1Hans Jonas, The Phenomena of Life: Towards a Philosophical
Biology (New York, N.Y.: Dell Publishing Co., 1966), p. 137.
2Ibid.
3
Ibid., p. 138.

31
coincide."1

Music is a fitting example that Jonas uses to il-

lustrate the immanent objectivity of sounds.

Here sounds refer only

to themselves, and we have to rely on memory for an ongoing synthesis
of them into patterns.
According to Jonas' analysis, then, hearing is both a passive
and a dynamic sense.

It is passive in that by itself it does not

initiate any action in regard to sounds, but has to wait for the sounds
to occur.

Hearing, however, becomes dynamic when the perceiver actively

combines these sounds into meaningful patterns, i.e., through memory,
into information.
Throughout the process of hearing, the perception of sounds is
almost completely outside the subject's control.

He has no real

choice whether to hear or not to hear a sound except to provide a "state
of attentive readiness for sounds to occur."2
of sounds is quite important for survival.

This invasive quality

If we could shut off sounds

at will as we can light (by closing our eyes), we might not hear the
sound that might indicate danger to us.
Passivity, then, is a necessary consequence of the "event"
nature of sound, whether it signifies a real existent out there or
whether, like music (or, to relate this analysis to the overall topic
of the paper, perhaps even like a saga), it just has an immanent objective character.
Jonas further notes in a philosophical vein that hearing is
"related to event and not to existence, to becoming and not to being.°
'
Ibid., p. 137.
2
Ibid., p. 139.
3Ibid.

1?

How does Jonas' analysis of hearing apply to the problem of
the oral transmission of significant information in a culture/

A

few brief hints of this application of Jonas' analysis will help to
introduce Eric Havel ock' s examination of the Homeric mind, and will
help in the comparison and contrast of the two authors' views.
In oral communication, there sometimes is a tendency to be contradictory in what is said, as well as to be uncritical in what is
remembered and, henr, in what is preserved.

That is, on the part of the

speaker, any attempt to improve what is said would be done extemporaneously (and often in a contradictory manner to what was said before); whereas
on the part of the listener, any attempt to hold at a distance, to view
objectively, and hence to notice contradictions and/or to make major
revisions in the very large mass of material which is presented sequentially to his mind could not Possibly be done as adequately or as thoroughly
as could be done by a literate mind with a writing technology at hand.
The sequential nature of sounds, where sounds follow one another
in a temporal sequence, tends to emphasize the evanescent nature of whatever we hear.

With large masses of material to be remembered, we tend

to lose much of what we hear and, as well, to change the remainder as
we attempt to tell someone else what we have heard.

Thus one would have

to organize what is heard in order to make it simpler to memorize and to
pass on unaltered.
It would be expected that in an oral culture, important information would be carried along in the context of the story--thus making
it easier to remember.

Easily visualized and concrete items, as well,

are relatively easy to memorize and to use in a story.

Therefore,

highly practical information is the kind of information that would tend

H
to be preserved in an oral culture.
With oral memory being such a large facet of life, both the
indirect object reference and the immanent objective character of sounds
which Jonas proposes make the hearer forget the speaker and focus on
the sounds themselves.

This intense focus on the sounds makes the

hearer forget the world around him, and makes him "live" in the story
which the sounds (through their immanent objective character) have made
to seem real.

To the extent that sounds seem to become ohjectively real

the characteristics of sound and hearing would give the individual a
biased picture of reality--a picture warped through the faculty of a
dominant sense--in this case, all reality would be seen from the
perspective of hearing as the vehicle of transmission.
The extent to which these amplifications of Jonas

views fit

the preservation of knowledge in an oral culture as analyzed by Havelock
will be examined in the next two chapters where the focus will be on
what is said and how it is remembered.

CHAPTER III
MEMORIZATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
The major goal of Chapters III and IV is to ascertain the
nature of (1) the Homeric/oral type of mind--how it works (psychological factors) and what it thinks (the content) and (2) the
mechanisms which developed and sustained the Homeric mind.
The psychological processes which facilitate memory will be
studied in Chapter III, while the content of the Homeric mind will he examined in Chapter IV.

However, the discussion of the characteristics of

the Homeric mind and the mechanisms which seem to have produced that
mind will be delayed until the concluding pages of Chapter Iv, after
the necessary groundwork has been laid.

Since both memory and what

is spoken seem to be conditioned by the phenomenal process of hearing
and sound, through which all information must he filtered, the relevance
of Jonas' analysis of the sense of hearing will he kept in mind
throughout both chapters.
Most of the evidence for Eric Havelock's position concerning
the Homeric state of mind is based on his analysis of the Greek sagas
the Iliad and the Odyssey.

Therefore, the essential focus of this

section of the paper concerning the psychological conditions necessary
for (1) the poetic performance of the sagas and for (2) the process
of learning large amounts of orally presented material will he on the
laws and structures which Havelock abstracts from his study of the
14

Iliad and the Odyssey; little material from these sagas themselves
will actually be examined.
In a literate culture, memorization consists of first seeing
the printed page, then identifying the symbols on it, and lastly,
attempting to memorize it.

The symbols themselves are passive in

relation to Ts:
['they] have no power over us; they are silent and lifeless. We
then do one of two things or a combination of two things; we
either recollect our vision of these symbols so that we can see
them again in the same order if we shut our eyes, or we translate
them into sounds which in practice we have to mutter or recite
'to ourselves', as we say.I
Thus in a literate culture, performing the activity of memorization on
passive symbols can take considerable effort, even though the symbols
themselves remain stable so that they can be rechecked.

But in an

oral culture, the dynamic material presented impinges upon the listener.
In oral memorization, the individual may have to be active to an extent,
but is helped by the fact that the material is organized and arranged
in a fashion that is especially conducive to oral memorization.

That

is, the material as presented is a "structured" becoming and is therefore aligned with certain psychological abilities of oral communication
in an individual.
Three ways or methods which Havelock believes help structure
the mass of material to be learned in oral memorization are the following: (1) the variety of possible linguistic statements has to be
severely reduced in number; (2) "the co-operation of a whole series of
motor reflexes throughout the entire body

5rt7

enlisted to make

memorisation and future recall and repetition more effective"2; and

'Havelock, Preface to Plato, p. 146.
2 Ibid., p. 157.
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(3) the use of these bodily reflexes gives direct pleasure and
provides relief from unpleasant emotions such as fear and stress.
In doing this, these reflexes, in a sense, take over and provide an
"emotional release for the unconscious layers of personality."1
In discussing how the first of these three (the reducing of
the possible variety of linguistic statements) works, Havelock examines
two mechanisms of memorization that help make this reduction possible.
These two mechanisms are repetition and metrical scheme.
There are three kinds of repetition:

first, "sheer repetition

. . Hector is dead; Hector is dead"; second, "a formulaic variation of
word order . . . Hector is dead; dead indeed is Hector," with the meaning still unchanged; and third, "looking at /the same essential image
from different aspects or in slightly different ways by using words and
syntax which do not alter the essential situation but restate it . . .
Hector is dead; fallen is Hector.

Yea Achilles slew him.

Hector is

defeated, Hector is dead."2
Thus, an essentially simple image--Hector's death--is transformed into a form that is more complex, more powerful, and more meaningful,
as that image is expressed in increasingly complex ways through each of
the three kinds of repetition.

The basic principle of such a change in

form is that of identity--but a type of identity that yields to slight
variation.

According to Havelock, "The mind's attention is continually

bifocal:

it preserves an identity, yet it makes room for a difference
within this identity."3
'Ibid.
2
Ibid., p. 147.
3Ibid.
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The second mechanism of memorization is that of a metrical
scheme which refers only to the sounds involved in the recitation of a
poem, not to the meaninn of the sounds, and which contains two units
of repetition, namely, the foot or bar and the line.

A metrical schemP

can vary in three ways which Havelock believes parallel the three kinds
of repetition.

For example, like sheer repetition, a metrical scheme

can he repeated without any variation in either the constant repetition
of the same stress pattern within a single line, or in the repetition of
a constant stress pattern from one line to the next; or, like the second
type of repetition in which there is slight variation, a constant
metrical scheme may have a single variant which is repeated with regularity: or, like the third type of repetition, a metrical scheme may vary
irregularly--more daringly and somewhat contrary to the scheme's constant
formula.

The effect of the repetition of a metrical scheme, even when

the repetition is varied, is to aid memorization, as Havelock explains
in discussing the third type of repetition of a particular metrical
scheme (dactylic hexameter) which is used in the sagas.
The meter is apportioned between lines of constant time length;
the lines are like slow regular undulations, each of which is in
turn composed of an internal pattern of ripples of two different
wave lengths. The metrical effect is once more a variation within
the same; the rhythmic memory constantly repeats itself)
"e such metrical patterns lack meaning in themselves, they
can be imposed upon "verbal formulas" that do carry meaning.?
These two mechanisms of memorization, namely, repetition and a
metrical scheme, as presented above, affect the ease of memorization
considerably by reducing the number of possible linguistic statements
'Ibid., p. 14P.
?Ibid.
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(as only certain types of statements or information can easily be
memorized by using such mechanisms).
The importance of reducing the number of possible linguistic
statements in orally preserved material is quite obvious especially in
light of the nature of sound and hearing as presented in Chapter II.
Since sound operates sequentially--is time-conditioned--it is evanescent.

When the sound (from reciting a saga, for example) passes

away, the information (contained in the saga) passes away too; so in
order to be retained, in an oral culture, information must be retained
in the memory in some fashion.

In general, the greater the amount of

material, the greater the difficulty in retaining it.

So if similar

events are reduced to formulaic descriptions, only one phrase or a
group of lines, instead of many, has to be remembered.
The formulaic building blocks with which the oral composer has
to work, and which are handed down through generations from poet to
poet, provide fewer possibilities of variation than do the structural
mechanisms used by the literate composer or writer.

G. S. Kirk, in

The Songs of Homer, explains how this limited possibility of variation
works:
[The oral poet'%7 expression and style are to some extent predetermined. Yet even so he can achieve different stylistic effects
by his way of combining phrase-units, as well as by adaptations and
new creations of his own. The phrases are usually quite short, two
to five words, and this means that their effect on style is not
overpowering; the sentences that can be built from them may differ
in individuality and effect, they may be rhetorical or ironic,
pathetic or factual, redundant or colourless.1
Thus the effect of this formulaic style is both to limit the
amount of totally separate phrases that have to be said and to organize
the mass of material in varying ways so as to achieve the greatest
1

G. S. Kirk, The Songs of Homer (Londaon, England:
University Press, 1962), p. 160.
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possible range of expressive power.

This reduction of possible

linguistic statements is then used in such a way to overcome the
limitations of the time-conditioned characteristic of hearing.
The following section dissusses why Havelock believes that these
mechanisms of repetition of content and of metrical pattern in the oral
composition, together with certain bodily reflexes, make the economy of
speech and thought possible, and therefore, also make memory possible.
In addition to the reduction of possible linguistic statements,
the second method involved in the oral learnino process concerns the
necessity of a coordination of a whole series of motor reflexes.
are three types of reflexes which Havelock discusses:

There

reflexes of

speaking; reflexes that are used when fingers produce music from some
sort of stringed instrument; and reflexes of the dance.
Speaking reflexes are set up as the lungs, larynx, tongue, and
teeth operate in the patterns of repetition and metrical rhythms
discussed previously.1

When using only the reflexes of speaking, how-

ever, the metrical pattern might be forgotten or rendered imperfectly,
since
In the first place, it is a complicated pattern in which you have
to remember several things at once or several possible variations
within the same. In the second place the speaker wants to say
something and not just make harmonious noises.'
Other bodily reflexes, therefore, are brought into play in order to
help retain the metrical pattern.

Por example, the reflexes of the

fingers and arms can be used to set up a rhythm in the body that helps
to preserve the poet's meter, as when one accompanies an oral performance by playing a stringed instrument.

However, Havelock does not

'Havelock, Preface to Plato, p. 148.
2
Ibid., p. 149.

20
believe that this use of a stringed instrument can he considered
music since it
exists only to make the words more recollectable, or rather to
make the undulations and ripples of the meter automatically
recollectable, in order to free psychic energy for the recall of
the words themselves.'
Even though Havelock denies that such a use of a stringed
instrument can be considered to be music, it seems that Jonas'
concept of "immanent objectivity," where sounds refer only to themsieves and not to external objects, is relevant.

Jonas especially at-

plies this concept to music; hut, of course, it can be applied to the
saga as well, with the saga's repetition and rhythm and the bodily
reflexes moving in harmony with those mechanisms--all of which involve
the listener to such an extent that he forgets that the performance is
just a performance and concentrates on it as if the whole thing were
objective or real (as was mentioned at the end of Chanter IT.

In a

sense, then, this would not only make the listener free to recall the
words, as Havelock says, but would also make him "live" the saga while it
is being presented.

(There are many activities, such as the playing

of sports, or even reading books, where, while one is involved in the
activity, one forgets the outside world--the activity takes over.)

If

this is so, the poetic performance would take over even to a greater
degree than in the other activities; and since, in effect, one lives
the saga, one tends to easily assimilate into his Londuct the paradigms
contained within, making the learning task involved much easier.

In

a sense, one would be "socialized" by the performance just as one would
be socialized by living in a particular culture, but the effect of the
'Ibid., p. 150.
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performance, in short range terms, would be much more intense.
The third type of bodily reflex which Havelock mentions
involves larger motor groups, such as the legs and feet, in dancing.
Much the same as the actions of the fingers on the stringed instrument,
dancing serves as a mnemonic device in order to enforce the metrical
pattern.

The audience, too, would be involved in the nerformance due

to recitation or even with small, perhaps undetectable movements of
their own legs acting in a sympathetic fashion.1
I want to emphasize that a type of communication such as one
which is orally based seems to bias the mind to the use of
a single sense--that of hearing, for example, in an oral communication.
While there is a tendency to isolate one sense from the others in a
major mode of communication, there cannot, of course, he any complete
separation.

The isolation is merely one of emphasis or perspective:

other senses, such as vision or touch, which might come into play in
the dance, or in the use of a lyre, etc., are used procrustian-like-in a supporting role for hearing.

Thus, visual effects, etc., are

used to support repetitive and metrical sound patterns to help memory
overcome the phenomenal limitations of hearing.
A particular sense, then, seems to orient the mind in a
particular way, both by the stressed use of that sense in communication
and by the necessity of shaping the material that comes in so as to
fit through the sense and to be made memorizable.
Our senses may, in fact, only be used in their phenomenal
capacity when they are selectively enphasized as a primary mode of communication.

Thus visual effects which phenomenally might be said to

Ibid.

22

show simultaneity of existence of various objects would, by mental
focus on the movements of the dance, show a time-conditioned sequence
of movements to fit the communicative pattern necessitated to transmit
and remember verbal material.
Havelock presents a list of seven "psychological principles"
which he says govern the intricate procedures of the poetic performance:
First, all spoken speech is obviously created by physical movements performed in the throat and mouth. Second, in an oral culture, all preserved speech has likewise to be created in this way.
Third, it can be preserved only as it is remembered and repeated.
Fourth, to ensure ease of repetition, and hence of remembrance,
the physical motions of mouth and throat must be organized in a
special way. Fifth, this organization consists in setting up
patterns of movements which are highly economical (that is,
rhythmic). Sixth, these patterns then become automatic reflexes.
Seventh, automatic behaviour in one part of the body (the voice
organs) is then strengthened by parallel behaviour in other parts
of the body (ears and limbs). The entire nervous system, in
short, is geared to the task of memorisation.'
These principles basically summarize both the ideas and the
arguments that underlie the use of bodily reflexes which Havelock
believes help the process of memorization during the poetic performance.
Along with the first two essentially functional methods involved
in the learning process for an oral culture--the reduction of possible
linguistic statements and the coordination of a whole series of motor
reflexes--there is a third and parallel purpose of these intricate
mechanisms, where "they fisepresent7 a mobilisation of the resources of
2
the unconscious to assist the conscious."
1 Ibid., p. 151.
2Ibid., pp. 151-152.

Beyond his capacity as an educator, the poet was generally
considered by the Greeks as the "great releaser..1
both pleasure and an escape from grief and anxiety.

He gave them
Thus, the

technology of the oral recital with its rhythmic and emotional involvement of the audience became a type of tribal recreation.

The motor

reflexes involved in this recreation operated automatically without
any real thought needing to be involved.

This automatic operation

meant that
like similar reflexes of the sexual or digestive apparatus, :the
motor reflexes.] were highly sensual and were closely linked with
the physical pleasures.L
Havelock admits that the total effect of this process would be
somewhat hypnotic.

The relaxing of physical and mental tensions would

heighten suggestibility to some extent so that learning could he
facilitated.
The linking of learning and pleasure, according to Havelock,
helped make the Homeric Greek a complete man.

What one wanted to do

and what was one's duty to do were not separate, but were one and the
same thing.

Thus, Havelock finds the Creek's enjoyment in Ufe and the

"capacity for direct action and sincere action and for direct and
sincere expression of motive and desire.3 explicable in terms of this
educational process of poetic memorization where the guide for duty
and action was provided by the sagas.
In summary, there are various aspects of Havelock's ideas that
are similar to Jonas'.

'
Ibid., p. 153.
2

Ibid., p. 152.

3
Ibid., p. 158.

Both Jonas and Havelock emphasize the dynamic
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nature of the sounds involved versus the required passivity of
the hearer.

Both authors emphasize the discrete nature of sounds as

they are presented in a serial order--thus, sound and hearing are
seen by both as time-conditioned.

For Jonas and Havelock, then, sound

and hearing are rather consistent with a dynamic hecominq-event view
of reality rather than a becalmed being-existence view.
a difference in the two views, however.

Here there is

Jonas' phenomenological

analysis is mostly concerned with sounds that we do not produce and are
not necessarily expecting, while to Havelock, the sounds presented in a
poetic performance are structured and in fact may have been heard and
memorized before.

One submits voluntarily to the poetic performance in

order to use it as a guide for life.

In a sense, then, for Havelock,

becoming "becomes" structured and therefore mostly expected.
In his exposition, Havelock claims that the act of memorization
and involvement in the poetic performance involves the whole nervous
system of the participant and that the effect becomes somewhat
hypnotic as the participant submits to the spell.

Thus, Havelock's

own exposition supports a contention that the participant becomes so
involved in the performance that the performance itself becomes real.
!'fioreover, according to Havelock, Plato's recognition of the hypnotic
effect of poetry is expressed by Plato's equation of poetry with a
dream-like state from which one must try to wake up.

1

Just how real was this dream-like performance to the gomeric
Greek?

By "real" I mean that the Homeric Greek experienced

the poetic performance while being performed as real as everyday life
is (or perhaps even more real since the fundamental patterns of mind,

Ibid., p. 240.

life and society were transmitted through the saga).

nuring the

performance, instead of being just a spectator, the (reek became a
participant or actor in the drama and was hence a hero or heroine, or
a god or goddess.

Therefore, the individual not only memorized the

saga where a section of it might he quoted in regard to some rule of
conduct, but the saga in fact could have such a hold on the (reek that
the proper action came about almost automatically in everyday life as well.
It has been noted in this chanter that various activities can
involve the participant to such an extent that he forgets the outside
world.

An example of such an activity is reading: and "losing oneself

in a book" is a common happening.

Who can say to what extent a reader

who lives with the characters and actions in a book may become consciously or unconsciously changed by this absorption?

If so, then this can

he likened to the idea that Homeric man, in his intense participation
in the saga, actually lived in the saga for a time and was thereby
changed by the experience.
Hans Jonas' ideas on indirect object reference of sounds and
the consequent possibility of the immanent objectivity of sounds, as
noted previously, also may be of use here in ascertaining the Possible
reality of the participation in the poetic performance.

The indirect

object reference of sounds means that the hearing of sounds does not
directly indicate the independent existence of some object in the
environment which caused those sounds; rather, we can only be certain
of the existence of sounds themselves, and can only infer that some
action of some sort of entity has caused them.

Thus there is a three-

step pattern involved in saying that something caused certain sounds
and, moreover, the existence of an entity which initiated the sounds
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can only be known by the action of some other sense than hearing.
These sounds with their loose object reference, according to
Jonas, can have a certain 'immanent objective" character of their own:
that is, the sounds can refer only to themselves, as in music, and
not to any external events or entities.

Therefore we can concentrate

on the musical pattern rather than he concerned with the musical
instruments which produced them.

It would seem then that one can easily

go beyond this analysis and see that in their loose object reference,
sounds can be tied in our imagination to whatever imaginary events or
objects that we desire.

In a Poetic performance with highly poeticized

imagery, it would be easy to reverse the three-step pattern of object
reference and believe that the sounds themselves and the stories
related indicate some real object or event in the world.

nne could

easily "see" the events and objects portrayed in the poetic performance
much as one can with a radio drama where one can easily provide one's
own mental pictures to go along with the characters and actions in
the story so that one "knows" how a character must look (and of course
one is often disappointed when he gets a look at those characters in
real life).

With the hypnotic effect that Yavelock says goes along

with the performance, the mental re-living of the saga would be much
more real than any radio drama could be, no matter how absorbed one
could be in it.
Another support for the contention that the poetic performance
becomes real for the participants can he drawn out of Jonas' "Sight
and Movement," an appendix to his paper on vision.

In this appendix,

he refers to purposive motility in the perception (and possible construction?) of reality.
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Only as purposive act does movement vitally contribute to the
organization of the perceptual world. Self-movement indeed may
be called the spatial organizer in each sense-species, and the
synthesizer of the several senses toward one common objectivity.'
Thus, according to Jonas, feedback from self-directed motion
involving especially hearing, touch and vision, leads to our perception
of a real world.

Jonas finds, in this regard, that excessive bias

toward vision, with its static picture of reality and subject/object
bifurcation, has led to epistemological agnosticism (where one doubts
anything can he known).

Jonas believes that a re-focus on the integra-

tion of the senses through motility may help the certitude of knowing.
To relate Jonas' ideas on motility to the idea of the reality
of the poetic performance--it is likely that we rarely ever use any
sense in total isolation from the others, and that motility always
plays a role in giving us a common obiectivity.

Thus even with a

visual bias we see a certain type of world as objectively real, even
if we feel that we can never know whether our view of it is true or not
(since we "know" that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the subject
and object).

In other words, as stated previously in this chapter, a

particular sense used in isolation, as, say, the main vehicle of receiving communication, tends to integrate other senses as supporting ones.
The other senses take on, in so far as it is possible, the phenomenal
characteristics of the dominant sense and support that sense in its
peculiar effects.

Thus the use of the various senses and their feed-

back by motility, given the use of the bodily reflexes (speaking, finger
moving, and dancing) in the poetic performance, provide a common
objectivity or sense of reality that would be consonant with the
'
Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, p. 153.
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phenomenal characteristics of hearing, and thus with the verbally
performed Homeric world of gods and heroes.

While in this perfor-

mance, the poetic performance can become "objectively" real to the
participants.
While the above arguments do not conclusively prove that the
poetic performance was as real as or more real than everyday life to
the Homeric Greeks, they provide support for Havelock's contentions
concerning the strong effect of the poetic performance on the Homeric
mind.

However, given the nature of this paper, where the main effort

is to show a close correspondence between the Homeric mind as analyzed
by Havelock, and a stage of individual mental development as understood
by Piaget, the use of the above analysis is primarily to further an
understanding of the Homeric mind as Havelock envisions it, and not so
much to provide a great deal of evidential support for Havelock's notion
of it.
This living or real character of the poetic performance can be
used in the following ways to support and enhance Havelock's considerations of the Homeric mind.
First, the more "real" the effects of the performance, the more
easily unconscious processes can enable one both to remember and to he
socialized by the saga.
Second, the more "real" the poetic performance is for the Homeric
participants, the greater the distance between the concrete mind of the
ancient nreek and that of our present-day "conscious" and abstract
mentality.

If during the poetic performance the nreek was hyonoti7ed to

some extent and was subject to unconscious processes, then the process
of memorization would not have to be a totally conscious process, and
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the disparity between the material memorized and the memorizer
would be lessened.

Also, the characteristics of the nreek mind

would be less likely to resemble the phenomenal characteristics of
hearing which have been seen to approximate the Homeric mind as viewed
by Havelock.

Therefore, the material of the saga would he some-

wnat abstract, and hence the Homeric Greek mind would be less qualitatively different from our modern (or even the post-Socratic) mind.
If the difference between the Homeric mind and ours were to be seen
as just a quantitative one, then the contention of this thesis (that
the Homeric mind according to Havelock is essentially the same as an
early stage of individual mental development, where stages are differentiated qualitatively, as proposed by Piaget) would be damaged.
A third possibility which should be noted is that the epic
might have been used for magical or cult purposes for the Homeric Creek
rather than just as a transmission of significant information, as
Havelock believes.

In other words, rather than the saga just serving

as a paradigm for cultural mores to help make the Greek acculturated,
as Havelock would have it, the poetic performance also may have served
to "enforce" the ideal of the Greek life upon the universe itself.
Perhaps by certain laws of similarity (which are magical laws), the
macrocosm would reflect the microcosm as performed in the saga.
Also, insofar as the performance of the saga was internalized
and hypnotically powerful, the words as structured by the phenomenal
characteristics of hearing would have a motivating effect on the Homeric
Greek, and the power of these words might have caused a real effect upon
the listener (hence, the magical power of words).

The Greek, therefore,

might have extended these magical words and magical performances (again
the microcosm) to affect the exterior world (trip macrocosm).
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Havelock seems intent on stressing the practical nature of the
Greek saga as a transmitter of significant cultural information.

So,

given the above speculation concerning the magical power of the performance, the Homeric Greeks might have had another practical aim, as
well --the strengthening of the Greek heroic paradigm upon reality
through a magical operation.
Material which will enhance this chapter on the psychological
effects of the poetic performance will be presented in Chapter IV,
where the content of the words spoken in the poetic performance is
examined.

CHAPTER IV
THE CONTEMT OF THE POETIC UTTERANCE
Since what is heard and what is remembered are the subjects
of Chapters II and III respectively, what is spoken, the content of
the poetic performance, can now be examined.

Havelock refers to the

study of the poetic content as the finding of epistemological laws
which "govern the arrangement of its language, the kind of syntax, so
to speak, within which this type of communication is composed."1
The epistemological laws (Chapter IV), as well as the psychological laws of the poetic performance (Chapter III), and the structure
of the hearing process (Chapter II) will all he examined at the end of
the present chapter in order to see what light they give on one of the
fundamental focuses of the thesis--that is, on the nature of the
Homeric mind and the mechanisms which helped to construct that mind.
As a means of preparation for the exposition of the epistemological laws, Havelock summarizes three psychological conditions which
he believes are closely related to the content aspect of the poetic
performance.

First, mnemonic rules of the poetic performance should, by

their very nature, be adaptable for use by ordinary members of the
general population, not just by the gifted few.

This general ability

to adapt to the mnemonic process is necessary if the preserved tradition
is to be stable and used extensively.
1 Ibid., p. 165.
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Second, the bodily reflexes
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Involved with these rules are a type of action which can be excited
through words that describe actions and hence help evoke those actions.
Third, the content of the performance therefore should consist of a
complete series of doings or events related by actions (of "structured
becomings").
According to Havelock, ideas or concepts, as in written
materials, usually do not involve action; rather, they are reflected
upon in silence and without any movement being necessary.
Re-enactment and emotional identification have no place in the
cognitive process proper. Rut they are essential to the rhythmic
mnemonic process, and you can re-enact only a description of
action.1
This essential need of re-enactment and emotional identification leads
directly into the content of the poetic performance, since action
presupposes an actor or agent of an action.

Havelock indicates that

phenomena can be dealt with via action in the saga if the phenomena
act as people act--only people, or beings similar to people (which can
represent phenomena) in the Homeric culture, are agents for actions-only they can initiate actions.
Moreover, not just any person or people will suffice.

It has

to be a special kind of person, a political person who can help
preserve the group's mores and thereby involve both the public and family
laws of the group.

These men must be 'political'

in the most general sense of that term, men whose acts, passions,
and thoughts will affect the behaviour and the fete of the society
in which they live so that the things they do will send out
vibrations into the farthest confines of" this society, and the
whole apparatus becomes alive and performs motions which are
paradigmatic.2
lIbid., p. 167.
2Ibid., pp. 167-168.
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These actors or political men who have this influence, who perform
acts that are considered to be paradigms for the whole community,
are known as heroes.

Thus the main reason for heroes in Homeric

society, according to Havelock, was both functional and technical
rather than romantic.1
But of course the sagas speak not only of heroes, but of gods
who act, as well.
of poetry.

Here one finds the use of metaphor in this style

Phenomena, for the Homeric 'reek, are thought of as acting

much as people do, with thoughts and passions, and therefore, are
thought of as gods rather than as impersonal forces.

An individual

Greek's moral action, for example, would not excite a response from
an impersonal natural force, but would incur, for instance, the anger
of a god (much as it would that of a person) and also would bring down
the god's wrath.

Thus, as Havelock says, the environment becomes a

"great society" where the phenomena represent individual members of
the society who interact much as humans do.

For the Greek poets, series

of actions by the gods replace any idea of an abstract cause-and-effect
relationship between events:
a sophisticated language which analyses history in terms of causes
and effects, of factors and forces, of objectives and influences
and the like, is in the living oral tradition impossible because
it is not amenable to the nsycho-dynamics of the memorising
process.2
According to Havelock, the most common metaphor employed by the
poet is that of a god.

Thus, the Homeric Greeks would say that a con-

flict (such as a war) was due to the actions of the gods; they would not
1 Ibid., p. 168.
2Ibid., p. 169.
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seek an abstract and impersonal cause/effect reason for the conflict,
as such a reason would not occur to their concrete minds.

To help

make the memorization of what we would call cause and effect happenings relatively easy, the causal chain can he replaced by a story
which might contain the emotions and associated actions of anger and
conflict.

Havelock defines the law by which one can understand the

use of gods in the Homeric saga.
crhe clods.] constantly provide an anparatus by which causal relations can be rendered in a verbal form with which the listener can
identify. They become imitable and so memorisable. The complexity
of the causative chain is simplified; the abstract factors are all
crystallised as the interposition of powerful persons.'
(It would seem that monotheism would be difficult to use in this
fashion, while polytheism probably would be greatly advantageous to use
in an oral saga, for many complex interactions and events could be
detailed as the working of a whole complex of gods.)

Havelock

emphasizes that the gods are organized in families and have relatively
stable characteristics (and are used formulaically, as discussed in
Chapter III) in order to help with the ease of remembrance of so much
material as is in a saga.
[The] stories (of the gods] thus in turn become paradigms of the
operation of the public and private law which it is the business of
the saga to preserve. They constitute a second society super-imnosed upon the society of the heroes.'
The heroes of the sagas themselves follow the normal human
sequence, beginning and ending with the boundaries of birth and death,
and with their acts and words in between.

But the hero, as well, is a

part of a succession of humans who follow the same sequence in their lives.
'Ibid., p. 170.
2Ibid., p. 171.
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However, given the hero's significance in the oral culture, where
he tends to embody the group's mores, his passing away threatens the
continuity of cultural tradition.

So the ceremony, for example, of

a funeral, and also other ceremonies such as weddings, provides a
transition from one state to another, linking and giving permanence to
the society's mores.
Certain characteristics of the Greek languane itself tend to
enforce this idea of an anthropomorphically expressed unbroken and
causal sequence:
The verbs which identify birth and death . . . were linked with a
predicate to represent an action or the result of an action. A
new situation is so to speak 'born' or created by a previous
action; a new phenomenon is born out of a previous one.1
All beings, and therefore phenomena, are born, act and pass
away.

All, that is, except for the gods.

The gods are born and give

birth and do all the things that humans do except die.
Thus the content of the saga can be viewed both as an "endless
series of actions" and as an "equally endless series of births and
deaths."2

Havelock indicates that these series of actions and births

and deaths can be applied metaphorically to phenomena as events.
it can fairly be generalised that the saga considered
standpoint of a later and more sophisticated critique
ly the record of a event-series, of things happening,
system of relations or of causes or of categories and

from the
is essentialnever of a
topics:3

This content of actions and events is consistent with the limitations
of the mnemonic process in an oral culture where the phenomenal
characteristics of sound and hearing have to be taken into account.
I
2

Ibid., p. 172.
Ibid., p. 173.

3Ibid.

All
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verbal information comes in sequentially-linked, discrete words or
phrases, and has to he linked by the powers of memory.

This language

of action and event provides organi7ing principles to aid memory so
that a great deal of concrete material can be remembered.
Consistent with Havelock's presentation concerning the action
and event character of the oral performance is Jonas' phenomennlonical
analysis of hearing.

Jonas finds that sound and hearing do not provide

direct evidence that there is an object behind a sound --one hears a
sound but only knows of an existent by other information that is gathered, for example, by sight and touch.
event and not an object.

For the listener, the sound is an

Therefore, similar to Havelock's analysis

of the content in a poetic performance, Jonas finds that hearing and
sound are related to events and not to existence.
Jonas and Havelock also speak of succession.

For Havelock,

there is an endless series of events presented in a saga (events which
are organized by a great story), while for Jonas, there is an emphasis
on the discrete nature of sounds where they follow one another in
sequence (which has to be organized by memory).
Generally, the language that Jonas and Havelock use in
respectively describing the characteristics of hearing and the nature
of an oral culture are both quite similar in terms of describing concrete levels of thought, events and serial relations.
However, to continue with Havelock's analysis of the content
of the poetic performance, the information and prescriptions presented
in the saga (or "tribal encyclopedia" as Havelock often calls it) are
arranged into sets of doings and happenings as the fundamental units.1

'Ibid., p. 174.
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These doings and happenings must be placed in the context of a
story or episode or else there will he an interruption in the flow
of the narrative with a consequent disruption in the rhythmic memory.
The chain of narrative association groups itself most naturally
around the acts of an agent whose image has been evoked in an
episode and whose words and acts then become the vehicles which
are made to carry items of the tribal encyclopedia.'
This narrative association is what L!avelock calls the "law of narrative
relevance" which is essential to the adequate Preservation of the
tribal encyclopedia.
While short episodes are necessary in helping to transmit mores
orally from generation to generation, such episodes have to go one sten
higher:

they have to be placed in the context of a larger story with

some over-all consistency of characters and coherent succession of
episodes.

The episodes contained in these great stories or sanas can

be recalled later by individuals to give specific examples on how to
act in any particular situation.

The saga, therefore, operates for

the members of the oral culture, in a manner similar to a paraHiqm.
The particular paradigm of action that is contained in an episode "is
recalled in its specific dynamism; its message may be general but only
in sophisticated retrospect.

The contents of the Iliad are the page

references for the oral memory.'2
In order to clarify the character or content of the poetic
performance, Havelock explains that it differs in at least three aspects
from a literate culture.

These three differences generally concern

(1) the time-conditioned aspects of the recorded events, (2) the
1 Ibid., p. 175.
2

Ibid., p. 176.
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discrete episodes joined together serially, and (3) the visual impact
resulting from the performance.'
The time-conditioned aspect of the poetic performance is
perhaps the most fundamental of these three aspects, and affects the
"knowledge" contained in the poetic record.

All events and hence all

knowledge concerning events have to be presented as related in time.
No events or knowledge can be considered to be free of this timecondition nor be outside of time.

Everything is related to the

past, present or future as an event or doing.
What /the oral record' cannot do is to use the verb to be as a
timeless copula in such a sentence as: 'human beings are responsible for the consequences of their own acts' . . . vantian
imperatives and mathematical relationships and analytic statements
are inexpressible and also unthinkable. Equally an epistemology
which can choose between the logically (and therefore eternally),
true and the logically (and eternally) false is also impossible.'
Thus knowledge, in the sense of being something which is true
at one time and equally true at any other time, is not really possible
for the Homeric Greeks.

The pre-Socratics and Plato then, according to

Havelock, wanted to substitute a timeless discourse of becoming.
The second aspect in which the oral performance differed from
one in a literate culture is the serial joining of discrete units of
doings or episodes.

Each of these happenings are self-contained

units with which the audience identifies.

The audience identifies

successively with each self-contained happening unit, which is linked
to the other units only by the law of narrative relevance which Havelock
mentions earlier.

There will be, in this linked series, a temporally

'
Ibid., p. 180.
2Ibid., pp. 181-182.
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organized word order where
the connection, implicit or explicit, between each doing will be
'and then'. Thus the memorised record consists of a vast plurality of acts and events, not integrated into chained groups of
cause and effect, but rather linked associatively in endless
series. In short, the rhythmic record in its very nature constitutes a 'many': it cannot submit to that abstract organisation
which groups 'manys' into 'one'.1
This type of "natural" thinking essentially concurs with the
natural order of things--the episodes are linked in the same order in
which they would happen in sensual experience, i.e., "temporal -dynamic"
order.

The abstract cause/effect type of thinking often begins by

describing the effect first and then the reasons or causes are
identified later.

Havelock says that it " . .

is the essential genius

of the rhythmic record that its units of meaning are like vividly
experienced moments of doing or happening."2
There is an associative linking of these moments of happenings
to form episodes (parts) which, Havelock says in this case, are greater
than the whole (the saga).

This episodic character and temporal link-

ing explain to some degree why the oral record is somewhat repetitive
and contradictory.

What is important is not the overall structure, but

rather the narrative relevance of the episode in the poem--thus, what
is appropriate in one context might not be appropriate in another
context, while the opposite statement might be appropriate in the new
context.
The third aspect in which the oral performance differs from a
literate culture is the visual impact which results from the performance.

The language of the poetic performance is one which is highly
lIbiA.. n. 181.
2
Ibid., p. 185.
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conducive to concrete imagery.

Abstractions are difficult or impossible

or visualize, while concretes such as actions and agents generally are
easy to visualize.
The visualisation thus exploited by minstrels was indirect. Words
were grouped as to stress the visual aspects of things, and so
encourage the listener to see with his mind's eye. The direct
techniques of memorisation were all acoustic, and appealed for
rhythmic acceptance in the hearing)
In contrast to the effort required for these techniques of memorization,
the written word frees the mind and the language of much effort.

The

language no longer has to have such an image-making power, and the
written record simply can be shelved or set aside until it is needed.
Havelock's stress on visual imagery in the saga recalls and
supports the earlier contention that the sense of reality of the saga
was heightened by other senses used in conjunction with hearing.

As

stressed before, a sense such as vision is not used in its fullest
character in the saga, but only those aspects of it are used which are
conducive to supporting the dominant auditory sense.

Specifically mention-

ed in this regard were the aspects of the dance, as its visual patterns
repeat those of the auditory sense.

However, Havelock says the most

intense visualization was evoked by the language of the saga.
Havelock summarizes these three aspects of oral communication and
even mentions a further aspect which he says
corresponds to Plato's definition of 'opinion' as a state of mind
that deals with becoming rather than being, and with the many
rather than the one, and with the visible rather than with the invisible and thinkable. . . . The whole experience becomes a kind
of dream in which image succeeds image automatically without conscious control on our part, without a pause to reflect, to rearrange
or to generalise, and without a chance to ask a question or raise a

lIbid., p. 18q.
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doubt, for this would at once interrupt and endanger the chain of
association.1
Thus Havelock stresses the passiveness of the listener in the
poetic performance.

Here, a slight difference between Havelock's and

Jonas' expositions may be detected--a difference again explicable by
Jonas' analyzing the sense of hearing itself, and by Havelock's analyzing
the major mode of communication in a culture.

ror Jonas, the listener

is rather passive in regard to sounds in that he has to wait for them to
occur, but is active in that he has to interpret or seek to understand
the sounds and their patterns in order to get their meaning.

Havelock

stresses the real passivity of an oral culture's listener who has to do
little to organize the sounds in order to draw out their meaning, for as
a performance, the sounds are already organized—the listener merely has
to submit to them.
Where Havelock stresses the passiveness of the perceiver and the
dream-like quality of the poetic performance, he approaches the idea
that the performance was as real or more real than "real" life.

What-

ever the actual case, if, as Havelock suggests, the epic as a great
story acted as a paradigm for the Homeric Greeks, then the epic would he
the centerpoint of their lives, because the paradigm would define and
determine the reality and truthfulness of all else with whirh they came
into contact.
Further insights into some of the fundamental problems with
which this thesis is concerned are now possible.

These problems concern

the nature of the Homeric mind--what it was and how it functionPd, and
moreover, how it got that way.

'Ibid., p. 190.

An assumption which seems to be inherert
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in the problems is that the Homeric mind was/is different from both
the later "classical" Greek mind and from our modern minds as well.
In fact, Havelock argues that the Homeric mind is qualitatively different from our own--that is, the difference is not merely one of
degree, but of kind.

The Greeks, then, had a radically different

perspective on the whole world than what we have; hut what snecifically
qualifies a particular mind to be qualitatively different from another
mind?
Most people with whom we come into contact seem to he different
from one another in that their personalities are different--thus presumably their minds also are different.

Physicists, as well, for example,

seem to think differently than do modern-day poets--hence the "two
cultures" of C. P. Snow; but generally, compared to the degree of difference between the Homeric mind and our own, the above mentioned
"modern minds" are virtually the same.

The modern poet, for example, is

less bound than his Homeric counterpart would be in portraying concrete
actions and events.

For that matter, the language which the modern poet

uses in his poems is filled with abstract words and ideas which, since
the physicist is a part of the same general culture as the poet, give
essentially the same abstract language base for both the poet and the
physicist.
The qualitative difference of which Havelock writes is a gulf
much greater than that between the two cultures--it is the difference
between the Homeric mine (which had not learned to form abstractions concerning the world and existence, and hence was overwhelmingly bound up
with the immediate phenomenal world of the concrete and with its visual
imagery) and the modern mind, fully comfortable with abstractions.
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Further explication of the nature of the Homeric mind will be
undertaken following a discussion of the mechanisms which produced that
mind.
How then miqht nature or nurture, or in modern parlance, genetic
or environmental determinants, mold a mind?
Havelock is not concerned with genetic determinants of knowledge but instead is concerned with environmental factors, i.e., the
effect of the poetic performance upon the hearer.

However, genetic con-

trols upon the Homeric mind are found in the nature of the sensory
mechanisms (since senses are genetically given), which condition the
nature of the information that can be passed along from individual to
individual.

The nature of the information in an oral culture which

thus can he transmitted is therefore consonant with the phenomenal
character of sound and hearing as isolated and intensilied by being
used as the dominant mode of communication.

Thus genetic sensory struc-

tures seem to control the limits of what can be transmitted insofar as
the fullest utilization of a particular sensory structure is accomplished
(in this case hearing), while other senses which act in a supportive role
are only used in limited ways.

In summation, genetic factors seem to

control the formation of the Homeric mind via the nature of the sensory
mechanisms of hearing.

Therefore, the environment (the poetic perfor-

mance and technology of communication) provides the information which
utilizes the various potentialities of the mind, and which selects the
particular mode of sensory structures (or genetic determinants) to be
used at a particular time.
The mode of communication of information is therefore very
important to the construction of the Homeric mind.

This fact is due to

4/1

how information of any kind (cultural or natural) has to be structured
to be remembered--it is very difficult to remember a large number of
disconnected bits of data.

To be very useful at all, information needs

to be organized by some dominant framework or perspective—data needs
to be placed into a hierarchy where new data can be fitted in and therefore remembered when required (which, in turn, depends upon what the
framework tells about the relevance of that data to certain problems
which arise).
A reason why the sensory modality of hearing, in particular, is
so important in this discussion of the Homeric mind is that its phenomenal character gives a "natural" screen through which new ideas are
filtered and are related to each other.

That is, the phenomenal

character of hearing shapes both the content and the form of the information which comes in; it is therefore easy or "natural" through
this conveniently available structure, to assimilate new ideas.
Oral communication in this way provides a major paradigm of the human
mind.

A paradigm is a dominant structure or framework which conditions

all other ideas that we have, and even governs what questions we can ask.
In contrast to certain modern examples of paradigms, such as
relativity physics or quantum mechanics, the oral type of paradigm is not
so much one which concerns what is transmitted but rather concerns the
mode of transmission.

Relativity and quantum physics help us see nature

in a clearer way, i.e., nature can be more adequately quantifible, but
these as paradigmatic revolutions in no way change the fundamental
sensory modalities involved in our human communication.

The fundamental

paradigms of communication (as metaparadigms?), on the other hand, involve
the various senses such as hearing and seeing, and their cultural
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artifacts--the poetic performance and written materials.
Thus, the construction of the Homeric mind, in the main, was
the result of the necessity of orally communicating large quantities
of significant information.

This oral mode of communication seems to

have shaped the Homeric mind in slch a way as to resemble basic
phenomenal characteristics of hearing.

This mental structuring can be

said to be a metaparadigm, a paradigm which is a basic structure of the
human psyche--one that, in paralleling the genetically determined sensory
modality of hearing, is a genetically given paradigm.
While the above discussion covers the nature of the mechanisms
which made the Homeric mind, it is still necessary to delineate the
precise nature of that mind.

While this, of course, has been covered in

Chapters III and IV, it is now necessary to summarize and to amplify
that material, as well as to relate it specifically to the basic tonics
of this paper.
The question concerning the nature of the Homeric mind can be
broked down into two subquestions concerning the form or structure of
the Homeric mind and the content of that mind.
will be discussed first.

The structure question

Since this paper is concerned with the com-

munication of significant information, the structure question may be reduced to questions concerning the organizational rules of Homeric thought
--what information will those rules admit in to that mind, and into what
patterns will that information be put?
Oenerally, as an oral culture is that which is being considered,
the information will be auditory in form.

Of course, the visual and

tactile senses will be used as well, but as mentioned previously, they
are used to supplement the dominant sense, and their features which can
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mimic the auditory sense are stressed.

The information impinging

upon the Homeric mind is largely pre-shaped so as to he easily digested.
This auditory information is different from the unexpected nature of
many sounds which then have to be organized, in that it is not
only pre-organized

hut, being performed often so as to fulfill its

educational task, is generally familiar as well.

The Homeric mind then

becomes passively receptive to this information which is preshaped and
familiar.

The rhythmic-repetitive quality of the sounds can carry the

relaxed mind along with the story.

The alertness of hearing, as well as

any critical mode needed to differentiate sounds into categories of good,
bad or indifferent, are relaxed.
Once the accepted information is in the mind, into what patterns
is it organized?

Generally, of course, this patterning will follow the

hearing/sound paradigm, as discussed above.

At this point, however, it

is more useful to discuss specific organizational schemes rather than
to reiterate ideas previously covered.

Basically, since the information

is filtered through an auditory sense, it comes into the mind sequentially as time-conditioned discrete bits.

In the non-abstract mind of the

Homeric Greeks, there were no abstract categories into which these hits of
data could be fitted for their differentiation and integration.

These bits

of data were not placed into these categories where they could become
"simultaneously available" to the psyche.

Instead, according to Havelock,

they were related in the natural sequence of things--that is, in the order
in which they were perceived.

Since the sounds were pre-organized into

episodes and great stories, that order is one in which they were patterned
in the mind and, as well, in which they were recalled when needed.

In the

becoming mode of mind, one episode of the saga could cause another and
yet another episode to be recalled.

Thus, the pattern of the Homeric mind
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was a pattern closely identified with life as the Greeks knew it.
Now that the structure of the Homeric mind has been discussed,
it is possible to cover briefly the content of that mind.

noing so

will broaden this explanation of the characteristics of the Homeric mind,
as is necessary for comparing this mind to Piaget's conception of the
pre-operational mind.
In general, the Homeric mind was filled with the images of gods
and goddesses and heroes.

These beings, who, as Havelock says, take

the place of impersonal phenomena for the Greeks, are seen in episodes
and great stories, impassioned and acting much as men act.

The actions

of these gods and heroes worked as paradigms which governed the minds
of the Greeks--they governed what the Greeks thought and how the Greeks
acted.

Thus specific actions of individuals could be governed by a

general paradigm of what a hero had done, for example, in the Iliad, and
thus, what one must do in "real" life.

These specific guides for conduct

were concrete and highly visual for the mind's eye.
The Homeric Greeks had discovered a basic genetically organized
paradigm of thought which lifted them above the chaos of what might seem
to primitive man as unorganized phenomena.

The Greeks were able to

organize and transmit what they termed significant information about their
environment.

They used this basic metaparadigm, albeit unconsciously, to

derive other paradigms which contained and helped transmit the specifics
of what they had learned.
The Homeric Greek, hound un with a living world of hecoming, of
which he was an event among many, did not seem to be alienated from that
world.

He did not, as it were, separate subject from object, since all

in his world was seen as a living subject.

These subjects moreover were
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all seen in a relationship as defined by the organizational parameters
of the Greek mind.

In his world of relatedness where the nreek was

moved by the power of the "dream," where the words and the performance
were not something he could just hear and ignore, he may have believed,
as well, that the world, filled as it was with living beings, could not
ignore him and his performance either.

CHAPTER
PIAGET AND THE PREOPERATIONAL MIND
In order to ascertain the validity of the thesis statement,
as presented in Chapter I, it is necessary in this chapter to show
the essential identity of the Homeric mind, as chiefly envisioned by
Eric Havelock, with Jean Piaget's conception of the preoperational stage
of mental development.

This identity will be examined with reference to

the origin and to the mechanisms of the development of thought.

The

mechanisms of development which Piaget proposes will be examined first
as a prelude to the discussion of the stages of growth through the mind
passes.

Only the preoperational stage of mental development will he

examined in detail, while the other three stages will be touched upon
only as they facilitate that examination.

Comparisons between Piaget's

preoperational stage and the Homeric mind are made at relevant points
in the discussion.
Jean Piaget's conception of genetic epistemology--how man's
ways of obtaining and organizing knowledge are related to man's genetic
heritage--reflects both his philosophical and biological background.
His focus on the development of the mind is presented in relation to
certain biological conceptions and terminology (such as adaptation,
equilibrium, and structure).
Piaget identifies intelligence with adaptation and defines
the latter as "an equilibrium between the action of the organism on
49
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the environment and vice versa."1

Equilibrium, for Piaget, is not

something which can ever actually he reached.

Instead, the organism

has to change continually to try to keen in equilibrium with an ever
changing environment.

This attempt to seek an equilibrium with the

environment is the goal of various types of functions—biological,
affective and mental.?

Thus, according to Piaget, cognitive develop-

ment is essentially an adaptive process.
Piaget's whole developmental theory revolves around this
biological idea of adaptation through equilibrium.

That individuals

charge in order to be in balance with the environment is the crux of
Piaget's notion of cognitive development.

His idea of structure is

a central feature of his concept of equilibrium.
/The interaction with the environment which /behaviour] instigates
. . . requires a form or structure to determine the various possible
circuits between subject and object. It is this structuring of
behaviour that constitutes its cognitive aspect. A perception,
sensori-motor learning (habit, etc.), an act of insight, a judgment,
etc., all amount, in one way or another, to a structuring of the
relations between the environmer.t and the organism.3
The cognitive structures or forms which provide the pathway
between the environment and the subject are known as "schemata."

A

child's schemata rapidly increase in number and become more complex
through increasing contact with the environment as the child matures
These cognitive structures or schemata change in the following way:

A

child first has a belief system (schemata) of a particular kind in
a near equilibrium (this cannot be a total equilibrium or else there
1 Jean Piaget, The
Psychology of Intelligence (Totowa, New Jersey:
Littlefield, Adams A Company, 1976), p. 7.
2Henry W. Maier, Three
Theories of Child nevelopment (New York:
Harper & Row, 1965), p. 89.
3
Piaget, The Psychology of Intelligence, p. 5.
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would be no energy available to change that schemata and thus no ne,d
to change or adapt).

New data in the form of experience is added to

the current schemata of the child.

This new data can be of a "repetitive"

nature, having no conflict with the old data; or it can he a new type
of data that does not fit in the old form so that there is a conflict.
Data which is of a repetitive nature and which does not contradict the
existing schemata in the child's mind is incorporated or "assimilated"
into the present belief structures.

This assimilated data reaffirms

the present beliefs and helps the individual grow quantitatively in
knowledge.

In this case, the organism puts its own structure on the

external environment rather than being passive in regard to that environment.

New data, as well, comes in from the environment which tends to

conform or "accommodate" the child's structures to the new data.
she] individual never suffers the impact of surrounding stimuli as
such, but they simply modify the assimilatory cycle by accommodating him to themselves. Psychologically, we again find the same
process in the sense that the pressure of circumstances always leads,
not to a passive submission to them, but to a simple modification of
the action affecting them.1
Adaptation, then, is not an imprinting of the environment on a totally
passive individual, but is an equilibrium between his assimilation of the
environment and the environment's accommodation of him.

David Elkind, in

his introduction to Piaget's book Six Psychological Studies, finds this
process of equilibration between assimilation and accommodation to be
dialectical in nature.
These two poles of activity constitute a sort of thesis and antithesis whose eventual synthesis is effected by a process of equilibration. In practice, this means that a new structural system is
evolved such that each new intrusion can he incorporated without
either a change in the structure or a change in the stimulus--in
'Ibid., p. R.
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other words, so that the integrity of the internal and external
systems is conserved.'
The motivating force for these changes in the schemata do not
result from some inner mental energy or Freudian "libido," hut rather
come from self-contradictions and conflicts in the existing schemata.
Therefore, while a new schemata establishes an equilibrium, it is not
a complete one since the child is opened up both to new information
and to new possibilities of contradiction.

Thus, each new structure

remains open to new development.
Thus assimilation is quantitative in nature (both repetitive in
acquisition of data, and attempting to fit data from the external world
into old patterns); while accommodation leads to qualitative change--a
new formulation of ideas in regard to the environment--thus the child,
in regard to accommodation, both sees and organizes information about
the world differently than he did heretofore.

A relation can he drawn

between this qualitative change through accommodation, for Piaget, and
the idea of qualitative change from the Homeric mind to a later abstract
mind, for Havelock.

This relation is not apparent at first, since it is

not apparent at a mere glance that Piaget views the difference between
a mind one day and then the next as a qualitative difference.

That is,

Piaget sees the process of accommodation as carried out in a continual
interchange between subject and object, wherein no great "qualitative"
difference in the mind from the way it was on the day before the accommodation took place can be observed.

However, the more apparent and

major change of accommodations comes about when the views and conflicts
1 David

Elkind, Introduction to Six Psychological Studies by Jean
Piaget, ed. Pavid Elkind, trans. Anita Tenzer (New York: Pandom ouse,
1967), pp. xii-xiii.

of an old stage are brought into agreement in a new, though qualitatively different, view.

Thus, individual minds continually change from the

day they reach a particular stage, and changes come about more rapidly
near the end of the stage when the contradictions and conflicts of the
stage are accepted as such.

Therefore the major stages which Piaget

delineates represent large scale accommodations in the sense that each
stage has enough major differences from the previous stage to make new
levels of mind qualitatively different.

This large scale "stage" level

is precisely where the agreement between Piaget and Havelock is revealed.
More will be said about their agreement when Piaget's ideas of the
specific stages are examined.
Now that the mechanisms for the generation of both the Homeric
mind and the mind according to Piaget have been examined, it is possible
to note parallels between the tvo.

Do the mechanisms or forces which

developed the preoperational stage seem to be the same or similar to
those forces which developed the Homeric mind?

It is quite difficult

to compare the two since Havelock delves very little into mechanisms
of development in a theoretical way.

For Havelock, the form of com-

munication which is chiefly used in the Homeric culture determines the
mode of mind found in that culture.

The necessary features of the

process of oral communication determine that the Homeric concrete mentality will result, while, as well, a literate culture "writes" on the psyche
certain dominant abstract features.

To use Piaget's terminology, these

cultural features of communication can he said to accommodate the individuals to those modes of communication.
While this process of accommodation through preliterate or literate modes of communication seems to determine the resulting concrete
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or abstract orientation of the mind, there are other factors which
contribute to the result as well.

Other factors such as geography and

economy, as well as the corpus of possible determinants of thought and
culture that have been proposed by thinkers, also should he considered.
Conscious invention, too, can play a part in forming cultural constructions.

This multiplicity of causes is more obvious in the case of

literate cultures (especially so since we have much more information
about them) than it is in the case of an oral culture.

If the mind

were dominated totally by the process of communication (literate or
oral) in a culture, then all cultures would be very similar in their
particular ideas and thought.

Instead, literate cultures all seem to he

capable of abstraction in a general way, but the particular way in which
they use this ability seems to be closely tied to many other cultural
factors.
The Greeks, then, while not the only culture to become literate,
stamped a rational -objective mode of thought upon their culture that was
not shared by other ancient literate cultures.

Thus, the Greeks could

be said to put a pattern upon reality that is peculiarly theirs--in
effect, to use Piaget's terminology, they assimilated the environment
into their own patterns.

For neither Piaget nor Havelock, then, is the

individual or culture a passive hit of clay to be written upon only by
the environment; instead, they are active shapers of the environment.
Are Piaget's and Havelock's ideas similar in respect to the
concepts of equilibrium and conflict?

Again Havelock does not speak in

theoretical terms about dynamic equilibrium where conflict and selfcontradiction always keep the structures mobile.

However, even though

literate thought is not examined in detail in this paper, it is clear that
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Havelock believes newly acquired literacy definately forms a conflict
with a dominantly oral type of mind.

Literacy provides a medium where

one can see contradictions in the oral messages which, until written
down, are related only in a auditory sequence of sounds.

The messages

therefore are not subject to direct comparison and contrast until, in
effect, they

can be seen at a glance."

This topic o

conflict will he

explored further when the characteristics of the preoperational mind
are examined in detail later in this chapter.
Havelock's conceotion oF the mechanism of the Homeric mind can
be fitted into Piaget's scheme of equilibrium between assimilation and
accommodation.

However, one problem which presents itself in this regard

is the postulate by Havelock that, for the Homeric mind, it is hearing
and its phenomenal structures which provide the major cultural patterns
that have to he accommodated to and, as well, for the later abstract (reek
mind, it is literacy as a mode of communication which shapes the incoming
information that has to he accommodated to.

While Piaget believes that

the preoperational stage is dominated by perceptual forms, he does not
identify them as specifically auditory in nature and does not believe
that visual/perceptual structures have much, if anything, to do with the
concrete or formal operational stages as Havelock might.

This conflict

may or may not be reconcilable, but mention of it will be made again
after more thoroughly examining the preoperational stage of mental development.

However, prior to examining that stage in detail, it is helpful

to place the stage in the general context of the whole scheme of stages.
There are four developmental stages through which a child must
go:

the sensori-motor state (birth to 2 or 3 years); preoperational

thinking (2 or 3 to 7 or 8 years); concrete operations (7 or P to 11 or
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12 years); and formal operations (11 or 12 to 14 or 15 years).1
stages are presented in order from the earliest to the latest.

The
1:ccord_

ing to Piaget, they must happen in sequence, for each new stage rests
upon the schemata of the one before and incorporates the old structures
within the new scheme.

While these stanes are separated according to

certain over-all differences of schema and are therefore qualitatively
different, there is no abrupt change whereby on one day a child is said
to be preoperational, while on the next is said to be in the concrete
operational stage.

In fact, in some situations, the child or person

can revert back to a previous stage.
A brief explanation of the sensori-motor stage will enable us to
understand the later stages.

A child is said to he in the sensori-motor

stage from birth to two or three years.

Pt this stage, the child's

cognitive schemata in terms of reflexes and his comprehension of the
world, are devined by actions.

Objects are not separated from the actions

which a child performs on them; a ball, for example, is not a round object but instead is something with which to play. -

By the end of this

first stage, however, the child begins to lose some of his egocentricity
and to achieve what Piaget calls the "object concept" where objects are
considered to continue to exist even when they are not beinn directly
perceived by the child.

Related to this object concept is the fact

that a child begins to internalize activity and therefore even when he
is not acting upon an object he can represent it in his mind by an
image which then can be used in a symbolic way.

The child, then, not

'
Guy R. Lefrancois, "Jean Piaget's Developmental Model: Equilibrium Through Adaptation," in Developmental Psychology: A Book of
Readings, edited by William R. Loaft Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press,
1972), p. 302.
2Ibid.
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only knows that the ball still exists when he does not perceive it, but,
as well, can imagine in his mind playing with it.
Given Piaget's insistence that later structures of the mind
simply have incorporated earlier ones, he also believes that
sensori-motor intelligence lies at the source of thought, and continues to affect it throughout life through perceptions and practical
sets . . . the schemata of sensori-motor intelligence form the
practical equivalent of concepts and relations, and their co-ordination into spatio-temporal systems of objects and movements even
arrives, though still in a practical and empirical form, both at the
conservation of the object, and at a correlative group structure.1
The preoperational stage, the focus of this chanter, begins with
language development at about two or three years and ends at approximately
seven or eight years of age.

With language development the child begins

to internalize events--that is, to think.

He is therefore less dependent

upon direct sensori-motor actions for the direction of his behaviour.2
Language also leads the child away from his egocentricity since it provides a method of communication with other individuals.

This communica-

tion with others then leads to modifications of the child's schemata and
thus to socialization or accommodation to the society of which he is a
part.
This second stage is known as the preoperational stage and is
therefore prior to "operations."

Defining the term oneration is thus

central to understanding the preoperational stage.
[Operation] refers to an action which is not only internalized but
reversible as well. An action is reversible when the child realizes
that an inverse action necessarily and logically nullifies it.3
1 Piaget, The Psychology of Intelligence, p. 119.
2Barry
J. Wadsworth, Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development
(New York: David McKay Company, 1971), p. 64.
3Lefrancois, "Jean Piaget's Developmental Model:
Through Adaptation," p. 303.
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Operations form systems and thus do not exist in a discontinuous state
as do empirical actions and perceptions. 1

The preoperational stage,

however, exhibits no reversals of actions and, being perceptual in
nature, forms no systems.
This preoperational stage is divided by Piaget into two subperiods:

the pre-conceptual and the intuitive.

The basic difference

between these sub-periods is one of degree, with the intuitive neriod
rather than the pre-conceptual period coming much closer to being operational.

For the purpose of this paper, however, differentiation into

these sub-periods will he ignored except where certain "intuitive"
characteristics of thought are examined.
There are various characteristics of the preoperational stage
that act to impede the development of operations or logical thought.
These characteristics include egocentrism, transformations, centration,
and irreversibility.
Egocentrism is characteristic of every stage of development from
sensori-motor to formal operations.

This characteristic is generally

the greatest at the beginning of each stage and lessens as the child
progresses through that stage.

The child in the preoperational stage,

however, is more egocentric and less able to take the viewpoint of another
or to put himself into another's role than he is during the later stages.
The preoperational child does not reflect on his own thoughts. As
a result, he is never motivated to question his thinking, even when
he is confronted with evidence that is contradictory to his thoughts.
In such cases, the egocentric child concludes the evidence must be
wrong, because his thoughts cannot be.2
1 Piaget,

The Psychology of Intelligence, p. 35.

2
Wadsworth, Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development, p. 71.

59

Thus in the preoperational period, the child tends not to realize the
existence of conflicts and self-contradictions in his schemata.

It

is not until about the age of six or seven that social conflicts
become more intense and that the child begins to see that there might
be another viewpoint.

In egocentrism, since the child does not attempt

to question his own thinking, he has a tendency to assimilate instead
of to accommodate.

Thus the acquisition of any new cognitive structures

during this period is inhibited.'
A characteristic of the Homeric mind, which is closely related to
egocentricism in the preoperational child, is that self-contradictions
and conflicts in the poetic performance are ignored.

This may be due in

part to the structural fact that in an oral performance the two contradictory elements are never present at the same time and thus are not even
noticed.

According to Havelock, however, the reasons runs deeper, in that

the Homeric Greeks cared more about the narrative relevance of an element
at a particular place in the story rather than whether it contradicted
another element in the story.

What was important was the context where

the element was used.
Could the aspect of the Homeric Greek's conflict and self-contradiction have another relation to the preoperational level child's egocentrism?

At first glance, it would seem that it does not, since the

child's egocentrism

(learly anti -social in nature while the Homeric

Greeks were well accommodated to their cultural environment.

However, as

the following discussion indicates, there is another tyne of relation hetween the two.
One of the characteristics of egocentrism in the preoperational

'Ibid., p. 73.
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child is that he is unable to assume the viewpoint of another; he does
not reflect on his own thoughts, i.e., if evidence conflicts with his
opinions, then he believes the evidence, rather than his opinions, must
be wrong.

The child loses his egocentrism via conflict with his peers

in society who have different viewpoints.

However, an abstract culture

as a whole is not tied to one perspective on reality--there is a multi plicity of possible viewpoints (which may conflict) on a given issue.
This was not the case in the Homeric culture where the saga provided the
viewpoint to which all of the Greeks presumably subscribed.

Thus the

Homeric Greek really did not have to question his viewpoint and did not
have to take the viewpoint of another since all viewpoints supposedly were
the same.

In this Nay, then, the Homeric Greeks, as the preoperational

child, were egocentric.

The Homeric Greeks did have contact with non-

Greek cultures, but information from those cultures which might provide
conflict with the Homeric culture was largely ignored as unimportant, as
"barbarian."
Another characteristic of the child at the preoperational stage
is the inability to perform transformations.

This inability to perform

transformations happens in the following way.
The child, while observing a sequence of changes or successive states,
focuses exclusively on the elements in the sequence, or the successive
states, rather than on the transformation by which one state is
changed to another
He moves from a particular perceptual event
to a particular perceptual event, hut cannot integrate a series of
events in terms of any beginning-end relationships.1
Thus, for example, if a ball were dropped, the child would focus exclusively on the starting position of the hall (before dropping it) and the
ending position (where it landed) and not on any process or intermediate
1 Ibid.

6]
stages in between.

Again, this inability to follow transformations

indicates the non-operational character of the preoperational stage
which, being basically perceptual in nature, is discontinuous and
non-systematic.
This characteristic inability to perform transformations is
similar to certain elements of both the phenomenological analysis of
hearing, by Hans Jonas, and the analysis of the poetic performance, by
Havelock.

Sounds, according to Jonas, are heard in temporal succession

as discrete elements.

They are never really heard simultaneously as

they cannot be distinguished from one another if they are.

In the hear-

ing of sounds, moreover, the elements are often non-transformational
to begin with, since there are no successive stages to hear between
the sounds.

Havelock's conception of the poetic performance also is

similar to this non-transformational character of the preoperational
child.

The sounds heard in the poetic performance are perceptual

elements which are arranged only in sequence and which therefore are
discontinuous in nature.

The sounds in the poetic performance are re-

lated by narrative relevance to form a great story.
The use of narrative relevance in the saga can be related to
the kind of reasoning which Piaget indicates is used by the child who
cannot form transformations.

This kind of reasoning is not deductive

nor inductive but is transductive or preconceptual.
Pre-concepts are the notions which the child attaches to the first
verbal signs he learns to use. The distinguishing characteristic
of these schemata is that they remain midway between the generality
of the concept and the individuality of the elements composing it,
without arriving either at the one or at the other. . . . ['transductive or preconceptual reasoning' consists of a sequence of
actions symbolized in thought, a true "mental experiment", i.e.,
an internal imitation of actions and their results, with all the
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limitations that this kind of empiricism of the imagination involves.'
Transductive reasoning, with its emphasis on imitation and internalized
sequences of actions, thus is the kind of reasoning used by the Homeric
Greeks in the construction and understanding of the saga.

Their reason-

ing, then, clearly was below the fully reversible level of operations
and above the totally isolated action which was characteristic of the
sensori-motor stage.

This transductive type of reasoning, being just

below the level of operations, becomes most highly developeH in the
intuitive sub-period of the preoperational stage.
Time and causality as conceiveH in this intuitive sub-period of
the preoperational stage are closely related to the inability to form
transformations.
Intuitive time is a time which is tied to particular objects or
movements and which has no homogeneity or uniform flow.
Thus, there is no objective time that is always the same over and behind the succession of happenings.

This consideration of temporal suc-

cession is like that given by Jonas when he analyzes hearing and sound,
where the focus is on sequence and the sound event itself, rather than
on abstract time beyond the events.
An important aspect of the poetic performance is that what the
abstract mind sees as abstract notions of causality, and inanimate
phenomena as causative principles, were replaced for the Homeric Creeks
by concrete beings who acted--gods, goddesses, ard heroes.

This is

similar to the Preoperational intuitive view of causality which Piaget
presents.

For events that happen apart from any manipulation by a

1 Piaget, The Psychology of Intelligence,
pp. 127-129.
2Ibid., p. 136.
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subject, there are causal links to explain them:
the explanation of the movement of rivers or clouds, the floating
of boats, etc. . . . were based on bodily action; physical movement implies teleology, an active internal force; the river "leans"
over pebbles, the clouds make the wind, which in turn pushes them,
and so on.1
While the child in modern society might not conceive of gods, etc. as
the explanation of such non-human actions, it is easy to understand why
an early culture such as that of the Homeric Greeks viewed such happenings as the result of the manipulation of subjects or beings.
A third characteristic of the preoperational stage, and closely
related to both egocentrism and inability to transform, is a tendency
for centration.
When the child is presented with a visual stimulus, he tends to
center or fix his attention on a limited perceptual aspect of the
stimulus. The child seems unable to "explore" all aspects of the
stimulus, or decenter his visual inspection. As a result, the child
when centering tends to assimilate only the superficial aspects of
an event. Any cognitive activity seems to be dominated by the perceptual aspects.2
In Piaget's example of vision, he includes, perhaps unconsciously as a
presupposition the possibility that the visual field has a certain
potential of simultaneous presentation to the child's own perception
(as Jonas indicates in a phenomonological analysis of vision not directly
examined in this paper) or else the child would not be able to decenter
his perceptions when he reaches the stage of operations.

However, the

concept of centration can be applied to Jonas' characterization of
hearing:

the sequential nature of sounds makes them basically difficult

to decenter.

Sounds as communicated in the poetic performance, however,

would come closer to being decentered by hearing than ordinary phenomenal
1 Ibid., p. 137.
2Wadsworth, Pia_get's Theory of Cognitive Development, pp. 74-75.

64
sounds would come, since the sounds in the poetic performance are
structured becomings--are patterned--and therefore are linked together easily by memory and understanding.
Piaget sees the preoperational stage as tied to perception in
general, while the operational stages lack a direct dependence on perceptual concretes.

Rut it is possible that a particular mode of

perception plays a larger role in each stage of development than other
perceptual mldes could play.

One indicator of this is the close

parallel that is found in this paper between the preoperational stage
and the Homeric mind with its dependence on auditory perception.

The

characteristics of the preoperational stage are not only similar to the
characteristics of the Homeric mind., but, as well, are similar to the
phenomenal characteristics of hearing as presented by Hans Jonas.

More-

over, in that same phenomenological analysis of vision, Jonas argues
that abstractions and philosophical thought may use visual perception as
a model.

For Jonas, the phenomenal characteristics of vision basically

are different from those of hearing, much in the same way as Havelock
conceives of the difference between the auditory features of the Homeric
mind and the literary and thus visual mode of communication.

Thus

hearing and vision may play a greater and more direct role in the preoperational and operational stages than what Piaget would believe.
Perhaps, in visual perception by itself, decenterings and
reversals are not possible, hut when vision is tied to the significant
communication involved in literacy, vision becomes freed from the
tyranny of oral communication which distorts vision for use as a support
for the dominant sense of hearing.

It has been noted that a particular

mode of perception, when used in a supporting role for some sense in
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significant communication, may have certain features of it selected
and used by the dominant sense to enforce and assist the dominant
sense.

Therefore, visual effects in the Poetic performance are pre-

sented sequentially to assist the hearing effects.

Rut when literacy

became predominant, vision no longer had to follow the lead of hearing
but could explore its own nature and develop abstractions.

It became

easy, for example, to reverse one's examination of any section of the
printed page.

Vision, unlike hearing then, is not centered on some

perceptual aspect of communication and thereby bound to it but is free
to examine and reexamine in detail any particular symbol, word, or
thought.

Thus, the development of cognitive structures as Piaget views

them can be explained at least partially by the changing perceptual
structures that become dominant in different forms of communication.
Whatever the validity of the above discussion, the conception
of centering provides support for the parallel which this paper draws
between the Homeric mind and the preoperational level of mental development.
Centration, to continue the main line of discussion, helps
lead to the characteristic of egocentricity of thought, since all is
centered on the subject's action and is not made into an objective system.

This centricity, according to Piaget, leads to several other

characteristics which also are helpful in relating Havelock and Piaget.
(Sincq intuitive thought is from moment to moment "centered" on a
given relation, it is phenomenalistic and grasps only the perceptual
appearance of reality. It is therefore a prey to suggestion coming
from immediate experience, which it copies and imitates instead of
correcting. Now the reaction of intelligence at this level to the
social environment is exactly parallel to its reaction to the physical environment, and this is self-evident, since the two kinds of
experience are indistinguishable in reality.'
1 Piaget, The
Psychology of Intelligence, p. 160.
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Several points in this quotation are of value in comparing
the Homeric to the preoperational mind.

First, the phenomenalistic

character of intuitive thought resulting from centering indicates that
the preoperational stage is closely bound to perceptual appearances.
This feature, as mentioned previously, is similar to that of the
Homeric mind.

Secondly, the relatively passive and suggestible char-

acter of the preoperational stage where little reorganization of reality
is done, but instead is copied, also echoes the Homeric mind which finds
the template for reality in the saga.

Third, the equation of the

social and physical environment for the preoperational stage also is
similar to the Homeric conception of a great society of gods, goddesses,
and heroes who are the actors behind phenomenal reality.
Irreversibility is the fourth important characteristic of the
preoperational stage-Reversibility is the most clearly defined characteristic of intelligence according to Piaget. . . . If thought is reversible, it
can follow the line of reasoning back to where it started. . . .
The attainment of reversihle operations is extremely difficult for
the child. This is reasonable if one considers that all sensorimotor operations are irreversible by definition. once a motor act
is committed, it cannot be reversed. In much the same way perceptions cannot be reversed.1
Though Piaget, in another passage, illustrates this by visual perception
this irreversibility also must be the case in auditory perception where
sounds happen and pass away.

In the case of the poetic performance,

there is a story full of actions and actors; and since it is action, it
is irreversible.

Even if action is internalized, it is still action.

Havelock also points out that the happenings in the poetic performance
proceed in a natural sequence as they would in real situations and that
1 Wadsworth, Piaget's Theory
of Cognitive Oevelopment, pp. 75-76.
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that there are no such narrative devices such as flashbacks.

The

irreversible action then, to relate Piaget's conceptions to Jonas
and Havelock to a greater degree, whether operationally internalized
or as a sensori-motor action in the environment, has more of an "event"
character than it does an object or "existent" character, for stable
objects do not pass away as actions do.
In continuing the argument concerning the event character of
the preoperational mind, such a character again is evidenced by that
mind's egocentric nature.

This is because that level of mind is

centered on an object in accordance with the subject's own perspective ['and this] perceptual composition cannot rise above the
level of what [is described] as the "subjective" group, i.e., a
system centered with reference to the subject's own action, and
capable, at the most, of corrections and regulations.'
Thus an object, for the preoperational mind, is not truly
separated from the subject and his action, and is therefore not truly
considered by the child to be an object as we normally view objects-separate and existing in their own right.

Likewise, there also was

little separation between the Homeric Greek and his environment.
a part of the whole which was defined by its relation to him.

He was

There was

no attempt to objectify the world--for him to separate himself from it.
Thus, the Homeric mind also did not see objects in the world as truly
existing apart from him but as perceptual events impinging upon his
attention as sounds do.
The lack of general conservation ability in the child is another
important characteristic of the preoperational stage.

However, con-

servation will be discussed very little except for noting that
fit) is the conceptualization (schematization) that the amount or
1Piaget, The Psychology of Intelligence, p. 115.

6P

quantity of matter, stays the same regardless of any changes in
shape or position.'
It definitely would he interesting to know if the Homeric
Greeks solved conservation problems in the same limited perceptual
ways as do children at the preoperational stage.

Presumably, since

the ability to conserve is a result of the other characteristics of
peroperational thought, the Greeks also would be unable to conserve.
That is, of course, if the asserted parallels between the Homeric and
the preoperational minds are valid.
A very brief outline of the two operational (logical) stages
of development will be made in order to indicate the character of the
mind's thought after the preoperational stage.

The preoperational stage

prepares the child for the large step up to logical thought.
thought is developed in two stages:
that of formal operations.

Logical

that of concrete operations and

In the former stage, abstractions--and the

newly acquired abilities of decentering, reversing operations anH doing
transformations--are performed still on concrete obiects in the
world rather than on abstract ideas.

It is with the latter stage, that

of formal operations, that fully developed logical abilities are found.
In this stage, abstract operations are carried out on abstractions.
Of further interest, and related to the scope of this paper, is
the possibility that the two operational stages have characteristics
in common with later Greek thought.

Presumably the concrete operations

stage correlates with the pre-Socratics, and the stage of formal
operations correlates with the fully developed abstract thought of Plato
and Aristotle.
'Wadsworth, Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development, p. 76.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The central theme of this thesis involves the following
question:

Is the Homeric mind, as chiefly conceptualized by Eric

Havelock, essentially identical with Jean Piaget's concept of the preoperational level of cognitive development?

Answering this question

involves an analysis of the nature of the content and form of both
conceptions of mind and a discussion of the nature of the mechanisms
by which those minds developed.
To explain the specific formulations of these conceptions of
minds and their developmental mechanisms has been the task of the body
of this thesis.

A general summary and examination of the similarities

and differences between the two views remains to be given.
First, the parallels between the mechanisms of the Homeric mind
and the preoperational stage should be examined.

This examination is

complicated by the fact that Havelock does not detail his ideas about
the mechanisms, even though Piaget does.

The growth of mind, for both

thinkers, clearly comes about as the result of dealing with information.
For Havelock, it is the significant information in oral or literate communication that is important.

For Piaget, the dealing with information

through assimilation and accommodation is important, but it is likely
that he would see all information as "significant" for the child.
is the case, even though the egocentric child at first ignores any
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This
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conflicting information which comes in, since the child ultimately has
to take into the account others in his peer group who disagree with him.
For Havelock, however, information which comes in that conflicts with
the dominant paradigms as presented in the saga are ignored until
literacy makes it possible to notice the fact of existence of conflicts.
Thus, the preoperational child is always losing his egocentricity to
some degree.

The Homeric Greek keeps his egocentricity intact until

the advent of literacy.

If the preoperational child did not have con-

flicting ideas existing in the culture around him, he, like the Homeric
Greek, would stay the same until those conflicts became available.
Specific comparisons between Piaget and Havelock on dynamic
equilibrium and conflict are more difficult to obtain since Havelock
does not really speak in this theoretical mode.

However, using the

above analysis concerning information, it is clear that conflict spurs
changes in both the child and the Homeric Greek.
librium, too, is applicable to both.

The concept of equi-

The preoperational child is

continually losing his equilibrium, while the Greek culture is in a very
near condition of stasis until literacy changes things.

Thus, this

agreement between Havelock's and Piaget's views of conflict and equilibrium indicates that the views are analogous.
Another point of agreement between the two authors is that they
describe the development from one major type of mind to another as a
qualitative change--that is, a change in kind.

The steps involved in

this process are slow and may not be obvious on a day to day basis,
but become obvious over a long period of time.
The agreement between the conceptions of the mechanisms of
generation of both the Homeric mind and the preoperational stage of mind
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is significant enough to draw firm positive parallels.

It is likely,

moreover, that Piaget's language can be used to explain the process
of development and growth of the Homeric mind--such as assimilation
and accommodation of the information in the poetic performance.
In regard to what and how the Homeric and the preoperational
minds think, there also is very close agreement.

The four main char-

acteristics of the preoperational stage of thought--egocentricity,
centration, inability to do transformations, and irreversibility--are
comparable between Havelock and Piaget, though they are theoretical
formulations and are thu!, not the specifics of the preoperational mind.
Details of the discussion of the above general characteristics of preoperational thought and their agreement to Homeric counterparts are
covered sufficiently in Chapter V.
A more important agreement between Havelock and Piaget is found
on the level of the specific elements of the characteristics of the
two minds under discussion.

First, both authors agree on the perceptual

nature of their respective kinds of thought and minds.

The minds as

perceptually oriented operate in a non-reversible sequence of events
and actions.

These events essentially are discontinuous in nature and

form no underlying objective patterns of relations.

Second, the focus

of both minds is on the concrete action or event rather than on some
abstract idea or relation.

Moreover, neither mind would believe that

objects are truly separate existents from the individual as subject.
Both the preoperational child and the Homeric Greek are immersed in
experience and do not attempt to alienate themselves from it.

Third,

at the preoperational stage of development as well as at the level of
the Homeric mind, the individual is a passive perceiver of information
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--he has certain schemata which define what is, and he lets in
material that fits in with what he already believes.

Thus the child

is not aware of conflicts, and likewise the Greek hears only the poet
performing and ignores any possible different drummer.

Fourth, time,

for both types of minds, has no underlying objectivity hut instead
is just a simple succession of events.

Fifth, causality is manipu-

lation, either by the individuals involved or by outside agencies who
act in goal -directed ways.

Therefore, the specifics of experience

for the Homeric mind, and those of the nreoperational child's mind,
are identical.
Disagreements between Piaget and Havelock are on a more abstract
and theoretical level.

Piaget writes about perception in a general way,

but when he needs a specific example, he turns to vision to provide it.
This is the case, at least, in material researched for the purpose of
this paper.

Thus the preoperational mind, for Piaget, is bound to per-

ceptual structures with their limitations (which are stressed above as
specifics of agreement between the two authors).

Havelock, too, finds

a kind of perceptual bias in the Homeric mind, but it is an auditory
bias toward the poetic performance.

Therefore, for Piaget, perception

in general structures the preoperational mind, while for Havelock,
auditory perceptions structure the Homeric mind.

Material in Chapter V

covers more thoroughly this problem with the mode of perception involved
in the two types of minds.

In this regard, the agreement of the pre-

operational stage of mental development with the phenomenal structures
of hearing (via Hans Jonas) and the nature of the Homeric (via Havelock)
is so definite that the conclusion can be drawn that the preoperational
level of mind indeed is structured by hearing, which is used as
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communication in the language that the child has just learned.
That the highly significant relation between the preoperational
level of mind as described by Piaget and the Homeric mind as described
by Havelock i

not, one of coincidence, but is an indication that the

two authors are describing the same phenomenon from two different
perspectives, is an inescapable conclusion.
Given the identity of the two views, further questions arise.
Why are the preoperational stage and the Homeric mind the same?

Did

cultural development recapitulate individual development, or was it the
otner way around?

This seems to be a chicken and egg problem, for the

individuals in a culture have to develop these characteristics of mind
before the culture can be said to be that way, but, according to
Piaget, the environment or culture also has to have the particular
features available for the individual child to be able to develop those
features.

Presumably, the answer is that in a culture which developed

abstraction on its own (through literacy?), the individual and the
society would evolve together in their development out of the oral mode
of thought into the abstract literary mode.

For the Homeric Greek,

however, literacy and hence abstraction, according to Havelock, was
not developed by a slow process within the culture, but was introduced
from the outside.

72refore, certain individuals before otners would

have access to literacy and therefore could develop abstract abilities
before the general culture provided abstractions in the environment.
More basic, however, than what came first in the order of time
in a particular culture is the question of the origin of the culture's
particular cognitive structures.

Do these structures originate in

individual genetic blueprints which are realized only when the environ-
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mental conditions become right, or does the cultural environment
somehow imprint these structures upon the individual?

While this

question cannot be answered absolutely, several possible answers are
available.
Jean Piaget believes that the basic structure and directional
vector of cognitive development is genetically engrained within the
individual, and that the proper environmental conditions are all that
is necessary to bring out the specific stages.
Eric Havelock, unlike Piaget, provides no neat theoretical
answer; but some elaboration on his and Jonas' ideas,as mentioned in
Chapter IV, ic of use here.

A metaparadigm is structured by the

phenomenal characteristics of a particular perceptual mode used in communication in a society.

This metaparadigm then conditions all other

ideas and information in a given society, though its governing
presence usually is not recognized but can be seen as generally
comparable to Piaget's stages.

The senses which construct these meta-

paradigms are genetically given as regards their structure; therefore
the structure of the metaparadigm is genetically patterned.

Since

individuals and cultures begin with verbal communication which is much
more basic and simple than writing, they therefore exhibit mental
features which are keyed to the genetic characteristics of hearing.

Later

comes the development of writing, a more complex technology of communication in which visual perceptions are dominant.

Therefore, the Tetapara-

digm developed out of writing yields the ability to abstract.

This

ability to abstract would be common even to illiterate members of a
dominantly literate culture, for once this ability to abstract has
been generally achieved in the culture, the abstract mileau is that
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which will develop those illiterate minds, at least to a minimal
degree.
This alternative view of the development of these "genetic"
structures therefore has no hidden mental location for the genetic
component of cognition (as Piaget would imply)--these would reside in
the phenomenal characteristics of the particular senses which are being
dominantly used.

This view has the advantage of explaining the curious

identity of the characteristics of the preoperational stage with the
phenomenal characteristics of hearing.

As well, the development of an

organized technology of oral communication could explain the development
of the Homeric/preoperational mind.
Whatever the explanation, the fundamental identity of the two
minds examined--the preoperational mind and the Homeric mind--is an
intriguing fact.
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